It is great coincidence that Mauritania’s capital city, Nouakchott, which is hosting the summit of the African Union, AU, this weekend, is the birthplace of the major continental initiative in the Sahel-Saharan strip in March 2013 widely known as the Nouakchott Process.
Mauritania also happens to be the headquarters of the Secretariat of the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) that led to the formation of a Joint8 Force authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council in April 2017 to combat terrorism and transnational organised crime.
This dual history of Nouakchott is illustrative of both the successes and limitations of the AU in the Sahel-Saharan strip, as well as the ambiguity surrounding its role.
At the beginning of the political-security crisis in Mali, the AU fostered two initiatives: the AU Strategy for the Sahel Region adopted in 2014; and the aforementioned Nouakchott Process in 2013. This initiative aimed to enhance cooperation and coordination among various stakeholders including the intelligence services, military chiefs of staff and ministers in charge of security issues in the Sahel-Saharan strip.
Nouakchott’s dual history is illustrative of both the successes and limitations of the AU in the Sahel-Saharan strip. It remains to be seen how the AU Summit will assess Mauritania’s input in resolving the Sahel problem.
However, observers say these continental efforts have achieved limited results. They argue that while the Nouakchott Process brought about a culture of exchange and cooperation among security actors in the Sahel, the political momentum has withered as the last ministerial meeting took place in 2015.
